Skip to main content
Version: 2.15

Verify the CLI


This recording presents the essence of this page. It's recommended to read it in full for the motivation and all details.

Loading asciinema cast...

Edgeless Systems uses sigstore and SLSA to ensure supply-chain security for the Constellation CLI and node images ("artifacts"). sigstore consists of three components: Cosign, Rekor, and Fulcio. Edgeless Systems uses Cosign to sign artifacts. All signatures are uploaded to the public Rekor transparency log, which resides at


The public key for Edgeless Systems' long-term code-signing key is:

-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

The public key is also available for download at and in the Twitter profile @EdgelessSystems.

The Rekor transparency log is a public append-only ledger that verifies and records signatures and associated metadata. The Rekor transparency log enables everyone to observe the sequence of (software) signatures issued by Edgeless Systems and many other parties. The transparency log allows for the public identification of dubious or malicious signatures.

You should always ensure that (1) your CLI executable was signed with the private key corresponding to the above public key and that (2) there is a corresponding entry in the Rekor transparency log. Both can be done as described in the following.


You don't need to verify the Constellation node images. This is done automatically by your CLI and the rest of Constellation.

Verify the signature


This guide assumes Linux on an amd64 processor. The exact steps for other platforms differ slightly.

First, install the Cosign CLI. Next, download and verify the signature that accompanies your CLI executable, for example:

$ cosign verify-blob --key --signature constellation-linux-amd64.sig constellation-linux-amd64

Verified OK

The above performs an offline verification of the provided public key, signature, and executable. To also verify that a corresponding entry exists in the public Rekor transparency log, add the variable COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1:

$ COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 cosign verify-blob --key --signature constellation-linux-amd64.sig constellation-linux-amd64

tlog entry verified with uuid: afaba7f6635b3e058888692841848e5514357315be9528474b23f5dcccb82b13 index: 3477047
Verified OK

🏁 You now know that your CLI executable was officially released and signed by Edgeless Systems.

Optional: Manually inspect the transparency log

To further inspect the public Rekor transparency log, install the Rekor CLI. A search for the CLI executable should give a single UUID. (Note that this UUID contains the UUID from the previous cosign command.)

$ rekor-cli search --artifact constellation-linux-amd64

Found matching entries (listed by UUID):

With this UUID you can get the full entry from the transparency log:

$ rekor-cli get --uuid=362f8ecba72f4326afaba7f6635b3e058888692841848e5514357315be9528474b23f5dcccb82b13

LogID: c0d23d6ad406973f9559f3ba2d1ca01f84147d8ffc5b8445c224f98b9591801d
Index: 3477047
IntegratedTime: 2022-09-12T22:28:16Z
UUID: afaba7f6635b3e058888692841848e5514357315be9528474b23f5dcccb82b13
Body: {
"HashedRekordObj": {
"data": {
"hash": {
"algorithm": "sha256",
"value": "40e137b9b9b8204d672642fd1e181c6d5ccb50cfc5cc7fcbb06a8c2c78f44aff"
"signature": {
"content": "MEUCIQCSER3mGj+j5Pr2kOXTlCIHQC3gT30I7qkLr9Awt6eUUQIgcLUKRIlY50UN8JGwVeNgkBZyYD8HMxwC/LFRWoMn180=",
"publicKey": {

The field publicKey should contain Edgeless Systems' public key in Base64 encoding.

You can get an exhaustive list of artifact signatures issued by Edgeless Systems via the following command:

rekor-cli search --public-key --pki-format x509

Edgeless Systems monitors this list to detect potential unauthorized use of its private key.

Verify the provenance

Provenance attests that a software artifact was produced by a specific repository and build system invocation. For more information on provenance visit and learn about the adoption of SLSA for Constellation.

Just as checking its signature proves that the CLI hasn't been manipulated, checking the provenance proves that the artifact was produced by the expected build process and hasn't been tampered with.

To verify the provenance, first install the slsa-verifier. Then make sure you have the provenance file (constellation.intoto.jsonl) and Constellation CLI downloaded. Both are available on the GitHub release page.


The same provenance file is valid for all Constellation CLI executables of a given version independent of the target platform.

Use the verifier to perform the check:

$ slsa-verifier verify-artifact constellation-linux-amd64 \
--provenance-path constellation.intoto.jsonl \

Verified signature against tlog entry index 7771317 at URL:
Verified build using builder at commit 18e9924b416323c37b9cdfd6cc728de8a947424a
PASSED: Verified SLSA provenance